Welcome to Hell. The war went on as usual until the General Staff intervened. Missile

(becoming a corrupt official)

I served myself quietly as a lieutenant until, like Hasek, the General Staff intervened. This same General lost the battle with the control body and, masking his loss, sent out a directive “On a common understanding of security issues.” Simply put, before we only had to put bars on the windows if someone could actually get into the window, but now - in any case. And the doors are still iron.
The chief of staff read this circular from Rostov and said: “You’re an honors graduate, I won’t teach you, you’ll figure it out yourself.” And an almost august resolution to me: “For execution.”
Where can I get them, iron bars and doors? I forgot to say - the mid-90s, salaries were not paid for six months, the command unofficially allows officers and warrant officers to sometimes go fishing instead of serving, they need to feed their families with something. Not everyone at once, but on a staggered schedule, of course - someone must be in the barracks with the soldiers and take guard duty. There is no money for anything, except for transfers for the Rostov and Moscow headquarters - hunger is generally rampant there, but more on that another time.
The issue with the iron door was resolved quickly - one evening a fellow student and I warmed up a liter bottle - not for courage, but to pass the time, wait for the right moment, and “go to work.”
The soil in those places is too acidic, the pipeline corrodes quickly, so there is no escape - cold water is run underground, and hot water and heating are on top, wrapped in glass wool and wrapped in thick tin. This tin was ideal for beating the doors in Sashka’s office, in another part, and turning mine in the same way into iron ones. So we pioneered this very tin with him. I dragged the stolen goods to the unit and thought that I would never imagine an officer of the tsarist army, or whatever - Lieutenant Rzhevsky doing such an activity, but I myself had a chance.
It was easier for Sashka - he had an office on the first floor and didn’t have to look for bars on the windows - they were there originally. It was more difficult and longer for me with them, but the matter was finally resolved in exactly the same way - by theft.
For three weeks, the head of the apartment maintenance service, Galina Ivanovna, fed me “breakfast”, until one day I was unlucky three times.
A soldier ran away from the first-aid post, from the hospital, at night. Unauthorized abandonment of a unit, abbreviated as SOCH, in common parlance, respectively, in Sochi. At that time, the doctors were subordinate to the rear officers and the commander, having received a stick from the brigade commander, instructed the medical director to put bars on the windows in order to avoid further “self-propelled guns.”
Supply structures - what are they? Relatives - washes hands. The apartment maintenance service, even if it is subordinate to the commander, is still the same with the rear staff. One day Galina Ivanovna found bars for the medical director. Fortune smiled on me once. The chief medical officer turned out to be slow and decided to start installing them the next morning - I was lucky.
I didn’t know the background, but I guessed that it was unlikely that the two bars standing near the headquarters were intended specifically for my windows, however, since the deadline for the report to the district headquarters was expiring, I decided that grief comes not only from the mind, but also from insight. In short, my ensign and I made two walkways and ownerless bars into our office and brought them. The duty officer, who saw everything, was on leave from the next day - this was the third smile of fate.
No one came into my office except the commander and the chief of staff, so we calmly listened to the screams of Galina Ivanovna, who was looking for the loss. I remembered less about Lieutenant Rzhevsky.
Saturday was chosen as the day for hanging the bars, because Galina Ivanovna has a day off on Saturdays. On Saturday, right on time, a report was sent to Rostov on the implementation of the wise instructions of the General Staff.
On Monday afternoon, the rear brethren started a war. First, the head of the fuel and lubricants service came and demanded reporting on the regulated alcohol. Then the head of the clothing service caught our only fighter and “established” the fact that socks were used instead of foot wraps. The doctor dragged our fighter from lunch to weigh-in and tried to establish that he was underweight.
On Tuesday I had to go outside of schedule to check how correctly these guys handled secret documents. I completely forgot about Lieutenant Rzhevsky, so first the deputy came running, whom I also managed to convince that I was still thicker, and instead of technical alcohol for routine maintenance, they began to give us medical alcohol, they again began to supply canned food, so that we wouldn’t get burnt while wiping equipment, and other bonuses have also been added... In general, life has become better, life has become more fun!
At least two Russian bombs have already been dropped on the head of every militant in Syria, and they are still running. I think that the reason is in the 90s: corruption - it’s not just me, and it’s only in the official interests at first...

The war was going well until the General Staff intervened.
To start with, here are two interesting statements:

1. “The Debaltsevo operation may be included in textbooks, but so far there is too little information for its full analysis ( wow!! But what about the requirements for continuous collection and analysis of information? ). The speaker stated this on air on the 112 Ukraine TV channel ( job title in the style of “gloomy Ukrainian genius” ") ATO Andrey Lysenko. According to him, first you need to work with each fighter ( I recommend collecting another Maidan ) in order to bring together as much information as possible and get as complete a picture as possible. As of today, only reports from the high command are available. “Before making all the information public, we need to work with every soldier, from the private to the sector commander, and only after all the information has been collected will it be possible to create a complete picture of what happened. Because today we have only reports from senior management and command and individual commanders of individual units do not yet provide an overall picture so that this operation to withdraw the Debaltseve garrison can be deeply and completely analyzed,” Lysenko said. Lysenko also noted that there are a lot of questions related to the operation to withdraw the garrison, both to the command and to the organizers of the operation in the General Staff, and that is why President Petro Poroshenko gave the task to conduct a full analysis of the situation. "There are a lot of questions, a lot of questions for both the military and the command ( Are the military and command not the same thing? ) and to those who organized this operation at the General Staff, so the president really set the task of conducting a full analysis of this operation, drawing conclusions from the negative nuances that there are in this operation and making these conclusions for, so that in our military universities this operation is included in textbooks so that conclusions can be drawn ( well, yes, well, yes, a conclusion for a conclusion) both negative and positive,” Lysenko said.
2. Brigade commander of the 93rd brigade Oleg Mikats is confident that the supply of Western weapons will change the course of the war in Donbass in favor of Ukraine, this will help it win. He spoke about this in an interview with LIGABusinessInform. When asked about the supply of Western weapons, Mikats replied that these weapons will help us win (any weapon also requires brains, with which the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has problems). “These are more modern weapons, which we do not have. If we had such weapons at the moment, then there would not be a situation in Debaltseve, there would be no tank attacks, there would not be very many moments, because there would simply be no point in having there is so much equipment here. According to the same Dzhevelins, as far as I know, the most successful operation in history was using three crews, which knocked out 43 tanks in 2.5 hours,” he emphasized. .
(Why does Mikatsu need subordinates, give him “Jevelin”, he alone will turn the tide of the war)
Mikats graduated from military school in 1996. In 2008 he continued his education at the National Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He served in various positions, including: commander of a tank platoon, tank company, training tank company; served for a year in Iraq as part of a Ukrainian unit as a translator for the operations department; was a shift supervisor at a tactical operations center; deputy battalion commander; served 3.5 years as a regiment commander; served as deputy division commander and was finally appointed commander of the 93rd Brigade. In the Donbass, units of the Mikats brigade had a chance to fight both near Ilovaisk and at the Donetsk airport (i.e. “professional” in getting into “cauldrons”) .
Now, according to a letter from the Cossacks to the Turkish Sultan, an appeal from the “initiative group of officers.”
To the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine P.A. Poroshenko
APPEAL
Dear Pyotr Alekseevich! In the interests of protecting the Motherland, we appeal to you with a request and categorical demand to take immediate measures to replace the entire leadership of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Circumstances battle for Debaltsevo have clearly (once again) revealed that the most dangerous enemy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is its own General Staff and its satellite headquarters, primarily the command and headquarters of the ATO (sectors) (The term “battle” is used several times in the text, since, guys, you demand that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine be “put against the wall,” call this action a military one correctly). Let us substantiate this statement using the example of the battle for Debaltsevo. For more than 6-month existence of Debaltsevsky ledge (remember this figure, it is indicative of the time allotted for preparing the defense) The leadership and headquarters of sector “C”, the ATO and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine showed total incompetence in matters of tactics, operational management and operational planning. Moreover, the change of personnel in these headquarters during their rotations did not bring qualitative changes. Decisions on the placement of strong points and reserves along the defense line were made solely on the basis of contemplating paper maps (placement of strong points (I decipher: strong points are the scale of a company and platoon), i.e. the prerogative of the brigade commander and the commander of a separate battalion within the specified front line and defense zone) . Without reconnaissance and reconnaissance of the area, not to mention reconnaissance of enemy positions (What, the brigade and battalion don’t conduct reconnaissance?) . Visits to forward positions were extremely sporadic and mostly “theatrical” in nature. Not a single representative of the command or sector headquarters (ATO) in the entire history of the Debaltsevo salient has appeared on any of the KNP-NP network along the salient line, although it is from the KNP(NP) that one can visually assess the advantages or disadvantages of both their battle formations and and the enemy (you had 6 months where you were before ?). Exclusively “inside the dugout” work was typical for all representatives of the sector headquarters and, naturally, the ATO command (headquarters). Any crises (periods or what?) on (so “on” or “in”))) strongpoints were resolved exclusively by the forces of the battalion (brigade), behind whom was secured this area (strong point )("fixed" by plumbers, and the army defends) , by the battalion (brigade) commander’s own decision, using forces and means with own battle formations (up to certain moments on their own, and not otherwise!). If the unit did not have such an opportunity, one could only hope for the consciousness of the “neighbors” or a miracle. During the existence of the command and headquarters of sector "C", the commanders of combat battalions (brigades) and individual units developed a stable attitude towards these structures as useless and not solving anything in any issues (“a stable attitude” had to be shown before showing it, after a fight they don’t wave their fists) . Thus, the center for making all operational decisions and interaction between the combat formations of the entire Debaltsevo salient moved to the headquarters of the 128th brigade (Maidan decided?) . All artillery fire control was concentrated at the brigade artillery headquarters, including interaction with artillery reconnaissance of the 25th Separate Marine Brigade (this is not bad, let's see what happens) . Thus, the brigade artillery headquarters took over the unfulfilled responsibilities of the sector artillery headquarters, including interaction with senior commanders’ artillery on the basis of “horizontal” contacts (honor and praise!, after all, there was management) . In the process of combat work, stable direct interaction was established between the units of the Debaltsevo ledge without the slightest participation of the command and headquarters of the sector (thus, the command of the 128th brigade took over the leadership of the fighting, and, according to the signatories, it was successful) . So, on February 12, a group of fighters from the 40th Separate Marine Brigade of the 17th Specialized Brigade, led by the deputy battalion commander (battalion commander, you are still addressing the President) Colonel I.I. Shcherbina, call sign "Svat" (The Armed Forces of Ukraine cannot do without nicknames, the President will not understand otherwise) (died during a breakout attempt convoy (what is a convoy?, PQ17 I know) with the wounded on February 15), together with a group of soldiers of the 95th brigade in the area of ​​​​the village of 8th March, destroyed an enemy assault group of 15 people and defeated (How is that?) another of 22 people (a total of 37 people who stormed versus 40 with a support group, storytellers!) . They took one prisoner and took possession of the map of the commander of the enemy assault group with the situation and combat orders depicted. "Swat" on the air of the artillery channel (from KNP-1 25th Separate Marine Brigade) read out from the map and based on the results of the interrogation of the prisoner the enemy's tasks for the current combat day. After processing this data by artillery reconnaissance of the 25th Separate Marine Brigade through the channel, the battalion commander - the commander of the division subordinate to the ATO headquarters (created on the personal initiative of these officers) were ordered (order in the online store, by the way ), artillery strikes were adjusted and carried out on the enemy from the lines of transition to the attack and further inland to the areas of concentration of reserves and headquarters of this direction. As a result of these attacks, the attack that had begun in the center of Debaltsevo along the Chernukhino-Debaltsevo railway line fizzled out. The offensive in this direction continued only a day later, after the arrival of reserves and the replacement of battered enemy assault units . Remains of artillery (What, I just didn’t want to?) At this time, the 128th brigade repelled attacks on the Alexander stronghold (east of Chernukhino). Thus, especially since the beginning of the assault on Debaltsevo, the role of the headquarters and command structures of the sector (ATO) has degraded to zero (so the management of the 128th brigade “ruled” “successfully” before that , replacing the “failed” overlying control unit) . It is not surprising that on February 15, with the complete inaction of the sector leadership, two strongholds of the 40th Separate Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade of the 17th Separate Brigade were cut off from the main forces of the group without any instructions (the mechanic receives instructions, but the army receives orders, etc.) and understanding of prospects. Until the afternoon of February 17, they never received any help in unblocking, or replenishment of ammunition, or an order to break through . They made their choice and laid down their arms. Throughout the existence of the Debaltsevo salient, neither the sector command nor the ATO command took any measures to timely replenish the diminishing human resources and weapons. Thus, the loss of cannon artillery in the 128th brigade was about 70% (The brigade commander spent 6 months preparing, in a few weeks he lost 70% of his artillery, it was not for nothing that he received the hero of Ukraine, hmm...). ... Multiple (how much is this? And what was the enemy supposed to do with equal numbers of “defense heroes” to attack?) the enemy's superiority in manpower in the conditions of the impossibility of supporting our battle formations with artillery fire and, on the contrary, heavy fire from enemy artillery, led to the inevitable and mediocre death of our units on (on or in) strong points. And after the loss of key positions it would lead to the inevitable defeat of the entire Ukrainian Armed Forces group in Debaltsevo. Those. the death or capture of more than 2,000 Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel. Under these conditions, the command and headquarters of the sector and the ATO showed criminal inaction, remaining passive observers, recruiting the most combat-ready units for their protection (they said “A”, say “I”. Which specific units ?). Moreover, in the “narrowest” place between settlements. Kalinovka, occupied by the enemy, and an “empty” settlement. Logvinovo was “held in defense” by 4 soldiers of the 54th ORB on a faulty BRM!!! This led to the enemy leaving and consolidating on the “road of life” without a fight! (Where was the brigade commander looking, since he took over all leadership and knew everything?) The attempts of the sector command to “clean up” the area of ​​the settlement looked especially tragic. Logvinovo, in which two enemy BTGs were already holding the defense with the support of 2 tank companies (this information was reported to the sector headquarters), first by a platoon, then by a combined company assembled from several units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard, then by an attempt to gather cooks at the headquarters of the units and signalmen to break through the encirclement!!! On the 5th day after the loss of control over supply routes, it became clear to all unit commanders that such command was leading the entire garrison of the Debaltsevo enclave to captivity and/or death. In these conditions, proactive officers (Why, the general meeting decided!!!) raised the question of making an urgent decision on the organized withdrawal of troops from the encirclement, regardless of the availability of a decision from the “authorized headquarters”. A plan for artillery preparation and support for the withdrawal of troops was developed, ZKP (camouflaged command posts) (ZKP-reserve command post, new in the art of war, in gold letters on a board at the Academy of Ukraine) outside the boiler (and who was in charge there, history is silent) for fire control and communications. Remote combat formations were promptly informed about moving to the concentration point for a breakthrough. At the same time, reliable means of communication were used, and the sector headquarters was excluded from this chain. All units expected this, the only correct decision, so there were no problems with interaction between units and combat formations. By 2-00 on February 18, the formed columns began to break through. The units of the 128th brigade were followed by the remaining separate units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard and the police. Sector headquarters, along with support and security units, were notified of the withdrawal along with others (noble) in separate units and without being “clever” he joined the breaking through columns. By fire and maneuver, the shock units of the columns connected enemy strongholds along the route, allowing wheeled vehicles to pass through loaded with personnel (!!!) and the most necessary supplies ())) ). The remaining serviceable artillery of the 128th brigade, jumping out (whoever doesn’t jump is a Muscovite) in the first echelon to the “mainland”, immediately turned around and began fire support for the retreating troops. In the rearguard, the combat formations of the 25th Separate Marine Brigade retreated with separate groups of other units retreating to them, arriving from strongholds in the south-eastern direction. The 25th Separate Motorized Infantry Division provided the tank-dangerous Uglegorsk direction from which the pursuit of the retreating troops could be organized. Since during the fighting all the military equipment and vehicles of the 25th Separate Motorized Infantry Division were destroyed by enemy fire or were out of action for other reasons, the withdrawal was carried out on foot along a route of about 25 km in the rearguard of the mechanized columns of the 128th Brigade and lasted until 13-00 (the main forces fled on vehicles, the rearguard on foot, GLORY to the commanders!) . During the retreat of the rearguard, the enemy tried to cut off the route of its withdrawal with a flank attack from the side of the settlement. Sanzharovka. Enemy attacks were restrained and repelled by the stronghold of the 128th brigade "VALERA". Control of artillery fire on the attacking enemy BTG (the remnants of the "Sanzharov" group after our artillery preparation), despite the shrapnel wound and concussion, was carried out by the artillery spotter of the 25th separate infantry battalion "Kremen" (You can’t call the hero’s own president by his last name...). Fire control was carried out through the ZKP 25 OMPB and the ZKP 128 brigade, battalion commander 25 and deputy brigade commander 128, directly to the commanders of senior fire divisions (ATO), bypassing headquarters (via horizontal communication). Only after fully completing the combat mission of covering the flank of the retreating troops, in order to avoid encirclement, "VALERA" was withdrawn to the Luganka River. From the side with. In Novogrigorievka, the group’s retreat was covered by strong point 40 of the separate detachment of infantry fighting forces “Zozo” under the command of an officer with the call sign “Kremen”. This strong point was abandoned after the combat mission was fully completed at 5 o'clock. 40 min. 02/18/2015 Thus, having exhausted all possible resources to hold the Debaltsevo ledge, choosing the optimal moment (on the night after repelling an intense assault), with minimal possible losses (who will praise if not themselves) The completely encircled (at the time of the withdrawal) Debaltseve grouping of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with units of the National Guard and police was withdrawn. The gap of mistrust between combat units (units) and orbital headquarters GS (ATO, sector) is typical for all sectors of the front (sectors). Today, some “amazing” appointment mechanism is pushing people who are completely worthless professionally and morally into senior command positions. The level of mistrust of these “managers” has nowhere to grow! The current state of the General Staff and satellite headquarters entails mediocre losses of personnel and equipment, as well as further enemy occupation of Ukrainian territory. In addition, distrust of one's own command significantly reduces the morale and resilience of units. The problem cannot be solved by changing one person. It is necessary to replace all leaders authorized to make decisions with proactive ones who have positive experience in managing brigade-battalions in real combat conditions, who enjoy trust and respect in their formations, units and subunits (They forgot to mention Poroshenko). We need people who will not shirk responsibility, and who, in matters of the exclusive competence of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, will be able to propose and justify the right decisions.
GLORY TO UKRAINE! (Well, there’s no way without this, glory to the heroes...)
Approved by: Commander of the 128th State Brigade, Colonel S.A. Shaptala. officers' meeting of the 128th State Brigade, officers' meeting of the 25th Separate Marine Brigade, chairman Major Volik D.V. officers' meeting of the 40th MPB, secretary of Art. Lt. Lomaka V.A. General meeting of the 54th ORB (1st, 2nd companies and deep reconnaissance company), secretary Sergeant Major Shovkun V.A.
What did other unit commanders, except the commander of the 128th brigade, not approve of?
Ignorants teach ignoramuses.

Tasks assigned to the regiment for 1961 :

— organize continuous and sustainable management of regiment units. Ensure combat duty;

— take measures to strengthen military discipline;

— organize the correct operation of rocket, special and other types of equipment. Create the necessary conditions for storing ammunition for missiles, warheads and missile launchers. Eliminate breakdowns and damage to rocket technology and car accidents. Improve maintenance;

— take additional measures to improve the progress of construction of military vital facilities, to fulfill and reduce the planned construction time;

- organize comprehensive support for combat duty. Improve logistics support.

The year 1961 began with painstaking work to implement the requirements of the Regulations. Documents were developed, the composition of duty crews was revised, questions were worked out regarding the collection of personnel on alert and their occupation of combat posts, and the deployment of equipment at launch sites. Issues of preparing missiles for launch in accordance with new temporary standards were worked out. The tasks of performing marches while transporting missiles and refueling equipment from the Gardene unloading station were practiced.

These questions were worked out during the conduct of short tests, which were carried out, as a rule, in the dark. Transportation of large equipment, missiles and warheads is only possible at night. This was the call of the times. The question is: where in A.N.’s fairy tale? Does Tolstoy talk about Pinocchio about the Strategic Missile Forces? " The day passed, night came. And in the land of fools work began to boil" It might be rough, but it's accurate.

At the beginning of the year, the 2nd missile division was preparing to be sent to the state center. At this time, the issue of dismissal from the Armed Forces for health reasons of the commander of the 2nd division, Captain A.A., was being decided. Alexandrova. It was decided to send with the 2nd Division the commander of the 1st Division, already Captain V.E. Rusheva.

The commander of the 3rd battery Art. was sent as the commander of the 5th starting battery. Lieutenant V.P. Jumps. The post of commander of the 5th battery was vacant, since L. Smirnov, who was appointed to this position in 1960, soon abandoned it.

There are four combat crews of the 2nd division at the training ground (5th starting battery - V.P. Pereskokov, 6th - F.I. Zaporozhtsev, 7th - V.F. Gimonov, 8th - A.V. Somov) after additional studies and passing tests, successfully carried out four combat training launches of the R-12 (8K63) missile. The personnel of the batteries and service units were allowed to independently work on the preparation and launch of the 8K63 missile.

The role of Valentin Efimovich Rushev in the history of the regiment in the first, most difficult period of its formation and in preparation for taking up combat duty was noticeable, but unappreciated. Upon arrival from the test site, in August 1961, for a number of reasons, V.E. Rushev moved to RTB (Jelgava). Instead, V.P. was appointed commander of the 1st division. Khilkevich (from the sailors)

The commander of the 2nd division, Captain A.A., also retired in March 1961 for health reasons. Alexandrov, captain I.G. was appointed instead. Parmon (battery commander of the Tauragian regiment).

On April 15, 1961, the 1st Division received ammunition for missiles, warheads and SRT. From that time on, the division began combat duty as part of 4 ground-based launchers with the R-12 (8K63) missile, being in combat readiness No. 4.

Combat duty was carried out in duty shifts lasting two weeks. The starting battery duty shift included two officers from each battery. Moreover, during the duty shift, officers were selected in such a way that they represented all the specialists of the prefabricated crew. This was a headache for the division chief of staff. This composition of officers provided leadership to the personnel of each battery at the first stage of preparing the missiles for launch before the arrival of the remaining officers from the “winter quarters.” And if they were delayed, it allowed them to alternately prepare the missiles and carry out the launch.

Planned retraining for missile specialties has begun for officers who arrived from other branches and branches of the military and schools. The lack of necessary educational literature, a training base, the involvement of officers in construction and installation work at the BSP, and the solution of various economic works did not allow the regiment to sufficiently organize combat training for officers. Retraining for the study of the R-12 missile and ground equipment of the 8P863 missile system was carried out at three-month courses at the Riga and Rostov Higher Artillery Engineering Schools, at the missile department of the F.E. Dzerzhinsky Academy, at the army school of junior specialists in the mountains. Island, on the 4th GCP.

The withdrawal of the regiment's units to underequipped OPD, which began in 1960, had a negative impact on the state of military discipline. The number of incidents and gross violations has sharply increased. The cohabitation of division personnel with military builders also had a negative impact. Issues of quartering and organization of life for personnel were of serious concern. The personnel were housed in army tents (with the exception of one or two batteries, which were lucky enough to immediately occupy temporary prefabricated panel barracks - barracks). As the builders left, the remaining units of the divisions also occupied the vacated barracks. We lived crowdedly - two units in one room, all the amenities were on the street. Soldiers' canteens were deployed in parking and garage groups. Food was prepared in camp kitchens, water was imported. The officers ate soldiers' rations from a common cauldron. There was a struggle for survival. There were many complaints about the bath and laundry service. For washing, personnel were taken to nearby settlements: 1st division - to the village of Auri (10 km); 2 - first in Zhagar, and after completing the construction of the bathhouse in the first division - to the first division (20 km).

These trips caused bewilderment, since the whole meaning of the cover legend - "Technical Warehouses" - was lost, and the personnel - several hundred. Representatives of the KGB were also dissatisfied. Vehicles with awnings were used for transportation. In the summer there is dust, whether you washed or not, in the winter there is cold, and hence the cold. The cultural leisure of soldiers and sergeants also did not differ in content and variety. Nobody canceled the dismissal, but, strictly speaking, there was nowhere to go. Collective dance trips were the highest and practically the only achievement of mass cultural work. True, such trips, with rare exceptions, ended in brawls and fights with builders over girls. Discontent also grew among the officers.

There were cases of looting against the local population, both from the regiment's military personnel and from military builders. Who can tell them apart - they're all in the same military uniform.

Typical cases.

Around all three divisions, along the roads, there were individual farms, differing in lifestyle from Russian villages. There is more isolation here, individual housekeeping and extremely rare expressions of hospitality from the residents. At the same time, they showed greater honesty and respect for private property. The farmers did not know what castles were until “ours” arrived.

A particular “headache”, quite often, was caused by the loss of milk cans and dairy products. It was customary for the local population to hand over milk for processing to dairies, and since the farms were located along the roads at a decent distance, the farmers united into cooperatives and took turns taking the milk to the dairy. Milk cans were displayed at certain places on the roads. At the appointed time, the “milk tanker”, driving along the road, collected cans and took them to the dairy plant, and on the way back it delivered empty containers and dairy products, whoever ordered what. The owners of the farms, when it was convenient for them, took this container. The regiment's military personnel and construction workers constantly traveled along these same roads. Well, sometimes we feasted on “free” dairy products. And no matter who took them, our serviceman or a builder, all claims from the local population were presented to the “robbers, occupiers,” that is, to us.

In the mornings (especially on Mondays) there were often showdowns at the division checkpoints: someone with a complaint on dairy issues, demanding the return of at least empty containers; who was looking for their bicycle - the main means of transportation for farmers and unauthorized workers; Claims were also made about the disappearance of horses. Bicycles and horses were sometimes found near the wire fence of the residential area. The chief of staff, Major Shcherbakov, rode such an “orphan” bicycle around the territory of the 1st Division. There were cases of “expropriation” of small livestock (lambs and lambs), horns and legs, which were found in the residential area. And try and figure it out - who did this?

Cases of looting, regarded as political actions, were reported by the local civilian leadership to the highest authorities, and from there menacing accusations were made against the military. Therefore, one of the main tasks of the command of the regiment (divisions) was to establish good neighborly relations with the local population. They “paid off”, as a rule, by providing transport, performing a number of agricultural works (helping with harvesting vegetables, preparing feed), and performing construction work. Losses of the local population were compensated in the form of personal funds and alcohol. On some days, the heads of local authorities themselves asked for help and received it in the required quantity. All this made it possible to reduce the intensity of passions and be respectable neighbors.

IN 1961 Along with issues of increasing combat readiness, the regiment began to pay great attention to issues engineering support- camouflage, shelter for personnel, organization of security and defense. The BSP began to deal closely with the issues of camouflaging launch sites and structures in mid-1960, after a visit to the Tauragian Regiment by the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky. He was given a demonstration of missile weapons at the BSP and the procedure for personnel to act when preparing a missile for launch. As they recall, the Minister of Defense did not delve very deeply into the explanations and at the same time enthusiastically talked about his military service during the Second World War, and at the end he said: “ I did not see elements of camouflage and personnel protection" Issues of engineering support are on a par with issues of combat training.

In 1960, camouflage work was limited to repeatedly transplanting trees and shrubs into boxes and placing them at launch sites, repainting buildings, structures and all external visual propaganda green. In 1961 we went further. To camouflage positions and equipment, in addition to service masks, tens of kilometers of camouflage garlands were made by hand from wire and green polyvinyl chloride film, which were hung over the launch sites, KRT warehouses, and on certain sections of roads. Brigades were created in the batteries and a competition was organized between them to see who could wind the most garlands. The number of garlands made (in meters) was reported daily via the CP line (with a cumulative total) to the division headquarters. The frontline soldiers included 1,5,8 batteries. Portable boxes for natural and artificial plantings were also modernized, making them mobile, as a result of which all the bearings located there disappeared from the warehouses of the special weapons service.

Concrete surfaces were sodded and the launch sites were covered with peat. Here is the recollection of one of the participants in those events: “ ...We made attempts to camouflage not only the equipment, but also all the access roads to the launch sites. They cut turf in the surrounding meadows (how much of it was needed?) and laid concrete on it, leaving only one track for cars. All drivers were ordered, under penalty of severe punishment, not to drive onto the turf under any circumstances. But the rains came, and gradually everything became soggy and spread out. And then there was a rumor that, they say, a possible enemy had launched a satellite that could see concrete at a meter depth. And again we have work. This time everything was scooped up and taken away. Then the concrete was thoroughly washed with neutrals and such a whim did not hit anyone else. And imagine what it would be like in winter, when the “pyataki” (as we called the launch sites) had to be cleared of snow and ice to the concrete. It's snowing, and we're cleaning everything. I remember the expression: “No snow should fall on the position.” This is the disguise: everything around is white, but the nickels and the roads leading to them are black. ...».

Indeed, all the work done, as it turned out later, was not effective. The artificial film stood out clearly in the photographs and was different from living vegetation. The satellite images clearly showed the locations of the combat positions, indicating the exact coordinates. What fool would believe that the forest going nowhere, concrete roads and clearings with power lines were laid.

Coordinates of the combat positions of the RDN:

1 - 5628"43.07"N. 2320"35.93"E.

2 - 5623"14.35"N. 2319"24.78"E

3 - 5624"22.67"N. 2336"49.44". e.d.

In subsequent years, the "disguise games" were discontinued. More attention was paid to increasing survivability and concealing the state of combat readiness and ongoing activities.

Work has begun to improve the security of BSP structures, primarily from conventional weapons. Intensive construction of permanent shelters for personnel began. Industrial reinforced concrete structures were used to build shelters for 20-30 people.

In 1961, the system of security and defense of divisions began to be improved. Wire fences of the Sosna technical security system began to be installed, defense security plans were drawn up, defense lines were outlined, and forces and means were determined. Firing points were equipped along the perimeter of the BSP within sight of each other, and patrols and patrols were planned to be deployed on the approaches to the BSP during the threatened period.

In October Directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces No. ORG/9/61948 of October 17 1961, according to the Decision of the Military Council of the Russian Federation, in order to preserve the combat traditions of the 29th Missile Division, by succession, the Combat Guards Banner was transferred to the 51st Guards Rifle Division. At the same time, the following were awarded (transferred): the Order of Lenin with a diploma of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Order of the Red Banner. From that time on, the division received the name - 29th Guards Rocket Vitebsk Order of Lenin Red Banner Division. All personnel of the division were awarded the " Guard", and in the identity cards of the officers the rank of "Guard ..." is written.

On December 10, 1961, the 2nd Missile Division, consisting of four ground-based launchers with the R-12 (8K63) missile, took up combat duty. Division commander Major I.G. Parmon.

The year 1962 occupied a special place in the life of the regiment. In June of this year, the division command prepared the 79th Missile Regiment (Plunge) consisting of 2 ground divisions to carry out the most important government task to prevent the American threat in Cuba. This affected our regiment to some extent. The regiment not only participated in the transportation of goods for the 79 rp, but also accepted and temporarily stationed on its territory part of the units of the Omsk regiment, which arrived to replace the departing 79 rp, for the purpose of training and replenishing them with both officers and equipment.

And during the Cuban missile crisis, from October 14(The United States, using photography, discovered the presence of RSD in Cuba) By November 22, the regiment as part of the Strategic Missile Forces received its first “baptism of fire.” 22 of October, for the first time in the history of the Strategic Missile Forces, upon a combat signal, combat packages of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR were opened and the combat orders contained in them were accepted for execution. Although the barracks situation in the Republic of Vietnam was introduced on September 11, this date is in doubt.

The signal to the command post of the regiment and divisions was received during the lunch break, while eating. Most of the personnel were in the canteens. On command " Combat alert“Everyone was blown away like the wind - they jumped out through the doors and through the windows. At first, some confusion was felt - some rushed straight to the BSP, others went to the barracks to get weapons. And although everyone knew everything, the element of surprise still worked. This was evident both when officers received weapons and when secretaries received batteries of technical documentation. The standards for occupying combat posts and withdrawing equipment to starting positions were met.

Everything went as usual until the General Staff intervened. Although the packages were opened and combat orders came into effect, oral instructions from higher commanders followed, limiting the actions of personnel and canceling certain operations on combat schedules. Questions arose: to prepare the warhead for combat use or not, to refuel the MRT refueling tanks or not? And so on many issues that had to be resolved by higher headquarters, right up to the Main Headquarters of the Russian Army. At the command post, the actions of officials showed nervousness and lack of confidence in the correctness of the orders they gave. Many people's hands trembled when opening the packages.

Nevertheless, regiment, with some restrictions, was put on high alert. The personnel passed all the tests. The combat missiles were prepared for docking of combat warheads, which were transferred to the highest readiness - SG-5 (nuclear warheads were removed from containers and placed on assembly stands). All personnel of the regiment and RTB were in the position area, duty shifts at the BSP. The officers were transferred to barracks status. There was always someone from the command of the regiment and divisions at the command post. After some time, the situation in the regiment returned to normal: the personnel were constantly informed of the international situation; Party, Komsomol and military meetings were held at which applications were collected for those wishing to leave to defend Cuba and fulfill their international duty.

All this was preceded by a series of events in the relationship between the USSR and the USA. The military-political situation began to gradually heat up from the beginning of 1962:

— Nuclear weapons tests were resumed on both sides. Thus, in the USSR, in July, nuclear explosions were carried out at various altitudes in order to study the influence of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion on radio communications, radars, aviation and missile technology. And in September, Operation Tulip was carried out to test the R-14 MRBM with nuclear charges;

— The United States began to deploy its Jupiter missiles (flight range 3000 km) on the territory of Turkey and Italy, capable of covering the entire European part of the Soviet Union. In April 1962, 50 units of Jupiter missiles went on combat duty, 15 of them in Turkey, with a flight time to targets in the USSR of 10 minutes;

— in February 1962, the United States imposed an embargo on trade with the Republic of Cuba;

— a real threat of American intervention on the island of Cuba was created. Provocations in territorial waters and on the territory of the “Island of Freedom” have become more frequent (Operation Mongoose).

In April 1962, N.S. Khrushchev, the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and at the same time the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, came up with the idea: “ ...to throw a hedgehog into Uncle Sam's pants...", using the island of Cuba as a base for Soviet MRBMs. On May 15, the USSR Defense Council decided on military assistance to Cuba and the transfer of Soviet troops to its territory.

In mid-June, by decision of the Soviet government, the Operation Anadyr- a strategic exercise with the relocation of Soviet troops and equipment to various regions of the Soviet Union (including Chukotka). During the operation, it was planned to transfer to Cuba: missile systems with R-12 and R-14 MRBMs; operational-tactical missiles "Luna" (firing range 60 km) and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads; Il-28 bombers with nuclear bombs; S-75 anti-aircraft missile systems; mobile anti-ship cruise missiles. 85 ships were involved in transporting troops, which made 183 voyages to Cuba and back.

Army General I.A. Pliev, commander of the North Caucasian Military District, was appointed commander of the group of Soviet troops in Cuba (GSVK). He had the authority to use nuclear weapons (including ballistic missiles) in the event of a full-scale US invasion of Cuba. The Missile Forces group in Cuba was commanded by Major General L.S. Garbuz (from 1954 to 1958 - commander of the 85th engineering brigade of the RVGK). The main striking force was the 51st missile division (commanded by Major General I.D. Statsenko), which included the 79th rp with two missile divisions (commanded by Colonel I.S. Sidorov).

Interesting information about the progress of the transfer.

The crossing of the Atlantic Ocean took an average of 13-15 days. The captains of sea vessels were given secret envelopes (packages), which they had to open together with the heads of military echelons. The packages were opened twice: after leaving the port and after passing through Gibraltar or the Northern Straits.

Note on the front of the package:

To the captain of the ship

To the head of the military echelon

Open the package together after passing

They were included in the package.

A. - Order signed by two signatures: the Minister of Defense and the Minister of the Navy :

1. The ship should proceed to the island of Cuba. Destination port: La Isabela.

2. It is allowed to announce the destination to all personnel.

3. Conduct the necessary explanatory work among members of the CPSU, Komsomol and all personnel about the implementation of a special government task.

Start studying materials about Cuba (in the package).

4. After reading and understanding the contents, destroy this document.

B. — Separate special order e:

If there is a clear threat of capture of the ship, the captain of the ship and the head of the military echelon must take all measures to organize the disembarkation of personnel overboard using all available life-saving equipment and scuttle the ship.

The ships were accompanied by seven attack submarines of the USSR Navy.

By mid-October, approximately half of the 36 R-12 missiles delivered to the island were ready for docking of nuclear warheads and refueling of the SRT. Three missile regiments went on combat duty.


The following were within the reach of our ballistic missiles and bombers:

the cities of Washington, Charleston, New Orleans;

Cape Canaveral Air Force Base and the entire Florida area.

The Americans were confused. After all, they expected the approach of Soviet bombers with nuclear bombs from the Arctic, at the shortest distance across the North Pole, and the entire missile defense system was located in the north of the United States. And then there is danger from the south.

However, the deployment of Soviet missiles on the island of Cuba did not go unnoticed. The traitor, GRU officer Colonel O. Penkovsky (arrested on October 22, 1962), also had a hand in this.

October 14 A U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the American Air Force photographed the launch pads for launching the IRBM.

Further events unfolded as follows:

22 of October. US President D. Kennedy addressed the American people, announcing the presence of Soviet “offensive weapons” in Cuba and warning about the possibility of thermonuclear war. The President said: that the Americans are preparing a landing on Cuba; that a camp is being prepared for future Russian prisoners on the Florida peninsula; that Mikoyan had arrived in Cuba and preliminary negotiations were being prepared, and that he had not even flown to Moscow for his wife’s funeral.

22 of October. The USSR Minister of Defense ordered the country's Armed Forces to be put on high alert , cancel vacations and delay the demobilization of older people. General mobilization was announced in Cuba.

October 23. The US President signed a directive establishing maritime quarantine (blockade) in relation to Cuba. US warships (about 180 units) were ordered in the 500 mile (926 km) quarantine zone around Cuba to detain and inspect all merchant ships traveling to Cuba and back.

By this time, 30 Soviet ships and vessels were heading to Cuba, including the cargo ship Aleksandrovsk with a load of nuclear warheads (24 for MRBMs and 44 for cruise missiles) and 4 ships carrying two divisions with MRBMs R-14. Four diesel submarines with nuclear weapons on board were approaching.

American sailors received orders to stop them and, if necessary, by fire. N.S. Khrushchev ordered Soviet ships to stop at the blockade line.

Martial law was declared in Cuba, and Soviet troops on the island were put on full combat readiness. Combat readiness "critical" (for the first and only time in US history ) American troops were also brought in, both on the US continent and in Europe. NATO troops were also preparing to participate in the conflict.

October 24. At a meeting of the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union stubbornly continued to deny the presence of nuclear missiles in Cuba. The situation was heating up.

October 26. Kennedy ordered preparations for the invasion of Cuba. Khrushchev officially acknowledged the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuban territory. Negotiations continued. During these days, squadrons of American aircraft flew over Cuba twice a day for the purpose of intimidation.

27th October. "Black Saturday" of the Cuban Missile Crisis. A Lockheed U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba.

The US President decided to begin bombing Soviet missile bases in two days and begin military action against Cuba. Three missile regiments in Cuba were ready to launch a nuclear missile strike from all 24 launch positions. At the same time, the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Defense Forces, and Long-Range Aviation were put on combat readiness on the territory of the USSR.

28 of October. As a result of negotiations on the night of October 28, without consultation with the Cuban leadership, the Soviet leadership decided to accept American conditions: the United States would not invade Cuba if the Soviet Union removed its offensive weapons from Cuba.

The USSR Minister of Defense issued Directive No. 76665, in which he ordered the dismantling of missile launch pads and the full strength of the 51st Missile Division to be returned back to the Soviet Union. From October 29 to 31, the dismantling of the sites was completely completed, and from November 5 to 9, the Il-28 missiles and bombers were removed from the island of Cuba. On December 12, the Soviet side completely completed the withdrawal of personnel, missile weapons and equipment. The transportation was carried out under strict control by the United States.

Here are the recollections of an eyewitness to those events:

« ... Our transport outside the territorial waters of Cuba (the Cuban leadership categorically prohibited inspections in its territorial waters) drifted and awaited the arrival of the American inspection. The missiles were uncovered. First, the transports were flown over at low altitude by a reconnaissance aircraft, and then helicopters hovered over the missiles, at an altitude of several meters, photographing and counting them one by one. It was insulting and humiliating...».

It must be said that the decision to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba was made without the consent of the Cuban leadership.

On November 21, 1962, the United States lifted the naval blockade of the island of Cuba, and a few months later the American Jupiter missiles were also withdrawn from Turkish territory.

Although the situation around Cuba defused on October 28, The command to bring the missile into a state of constant combat readiness was received only on November 22, 1962.

Life has returned to a normal, peaceful direction.

Few people know that the name “Anadyr” is not accidental. What does this northern Chukchi River have to do with the tropical island? The name “Anadyr” was invented by I.V. in the early 50s. Stalin for another military action in Chukotka. According to his plan, the million-strong Soviet army was to concentrate in Chukotka for the invasion of the North American continent. On the appointed day, the army crosses the Bering Strait and Alaska is captured. Next, as they say, is “a matter of technique.” Stalin died on March 5, 1953, without having accomplished his plans. But the red folder with the inscription “Anadyr” remained. The baton of Stalin’s idea was picked up by N.S. Khrushchev. Only this time he decided to threaten America not from the north, but from the south. He decided not to change the Stalinist name of the operation “Anadyr”. At one time, in 1957, in Chukotka, at the Anadyr airfield, a missile-carrying aircraft base was deployed, and 10 km away. from the airfield there is a storage base for nuclear warheads. A missile regiment with an R-12 missile was also deployed in Chukotka. Later all this was liquidated.

Here's the story. Believe it or not.

1963 was the year of practical implementation and implementation of the experience acquired by the RV during its participation in the strategic operation Anadyr.

In February in connection with the new organizational structure in the regiment organizational measures were carried out:

the missile transportation and refueling division was disbanded . Refueling departments with standard equipment became part of the starting batteries, forming the fourth refueling departments;

to transport missiles and missile launchers (from the unloading station and between divisions), a supply battery was formed (battery commander V.G. Tuchkov), with two departments: the missile delivery department and the SRT delivery department;

Officer positions in starting batteries were reduced : in the starting department - a guidance technician; in the electric fire department - onboard technician (much later, somewhere in the 70s, the engine compartment technician was also reduced).

The question arose about the redistribution of functional responsibilities within combat crews and the training of soldiers and sergeants to work for officers. The new organizational structure of the launch batteries, the change in the initial state of the refueling facilities (they were located at the divisions' base stations) also provided for a change in the temporary standards for preparing missiles for launch. The starting batteries began working on tasks on reduced schedules. It is appropriate to recall here that at the end of 1962, the commander of the 5th battery, A.M., participated in the staff development group at the General Staff of the Russian Army. Platkov;

The position of deputy division commander was added to the ground division management staff . In the first division, B.C. was appointed. Tyrtsev, in the second - E.I. Lysikov, who previously held the position of chief of staff of the division.

In the Armed Forces, recruitment of female contingents into military service was organized . About 70 people aged 19-23 years old arrived in the regiment from the military registration and enlistment offices of Latvia and Lithuania. All of them completed the young fighter course in Dobele-2, took the oath and were assigned to headquarters, communication points, first-aid posts and rear services.

Spring 1963 in order to increase the survivability of ground-based launchers, in accordance with the order of the GShRV on the wider use of the moving properties of the R-12 missile system, the regiment did a lot of work on reconnaissance, selection, coordination with local authorities and approval reserve field areas (SFA).

One ZPR was selected for the first and second divisions.

The ZPR of the 1st division was located in a forest near the village of Annenieki, 25 km away. from the main position area (OPR), to the right of the Dobele - Liepaja (Saldus) highway. ZPR 2nd - behind the Gardene station, 45 km. from OPR.

The launch sites for each battery were determined and access roads were equipped. The most difficult thing was in the 2nd division, since the route of the columns had sharp turns and narrowing of the roadway (especially at the entrance to Tervete). In the area of ​​Gardene station it was necessary to overcome a bridge and railway tracks. At the launch sites, ramps were dug to accommodate ground equipment units and trenches along the perimeter. These works were carried out by the BBO regiment.

At the headquarters of the regiment and divisions, together with the service of the chief engineer of the regiment, all calculation data (graphs) were produced for the divisions’ implementation of tasks from the ZPR. The divisions' OPD crews prepared flight missions for a possible missile launch.

By July the ZPR were prepared. By this time, the launch batteries were already equipped with collapsible launch pads SP-6 and cranes for their installation (two cranes per division). In each division, the OPR was equipped with a training ground for training launch batteries on the installation of SP-6 and launch pads.

Marches were held with the drivers and officers to practice march discipline (speed, intervals between vehicles and columns) and methods of controlling columns on the march. Instructions were given on the specifics of the routes.

In July 1963 army commander Colonel General F.I. Dobysh, with the participation of representatives of the GShRV, carried out experimental teaching on the topic “Control of a missile regiment when delivering a nuclear strike in the initial period of the war from the ZPR.”

The following participants were involved in the exercise: regiment management (regiment commander Colonel Danilchenko), first division (division commander Major Markov), second division (division commander Major Parmon), support units. This was not only the first exercise of this kind in the Strategic Missile Forces, but also, in general, the first simultaneous deployment of 8 starting batteries of the regiment to the ZPR. The march was carried out in battery columns.

During the 10-day stay in the ZPR, fortification and camouflage work was carried out, the starting batteries repeatedly conducted training on the installation of SP-6, and the time parameters for performing certain actions were clarified. Much attention was paid to organizational issues of security and defense, compliance with the regime, and organization of life activities in the field. Everything went well, but the “Shkalikov Bridge” was remembered for a long time.

At the end of the exercise, the commander conducted a debriefing. The experimental exercise showed the need to improve the marching and field training of personnel, conduct systematic training on the installation of SP-6, and better resolve issues of supporting the life and service of troops. One of the conclusions of the exercise was that, due to their running characteristics, it is not advisable to move large equipment as part of battery columns. In the future, the movement of the division to the ZPR was carried out in separate columns: a column of battery equipment, a column of installers, a column of refueling equipment, a column with ammunition.

Based on the conclusions of the exercise, the foundations for carrying out combat missions by missile regiments from field combat positions were laid in the RV. Was developed and implemented Instructions for the occupation of field areas by ground divisions armed with R-12 missiles.

After conducting an experimental exercise on the withdrawal of divisions to the ZPR, the regiment was given a new, no less responsible task - send one division consisting of 4 starting batteries to the 4 GCP Kapustin Yar Moscow Region with one set of battery equipment, one rocket inspection department from the technical battery and one docking crew from the RTB. Launch batteries will take part in a pilot test to practice the procedure for conducting training on a combat rocket with its multiple refueling and draining of the SRT.

The task was to be completed by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th launch batteries of the first missile division (division commander, Major Markov). General leadership was entrusted to the regiment commander, Colonel M.P. Danilchenko.

In a more accessible form, the task was as follows: the 2nd, 3rd and 4th launch batteries must alternately carry out conditional launches with the actual filling of a combat missile with oxidizer and fuel and then draining them.

After each drain and removal of the rocket from the launcher, the inspection department had to carry out maintenance on the rocket and prepare it for subsequent training with the next battery.

The 1st launch battery (battery commander G.S. Taraban) was supposed to conduct a real combat training launch, completing all operations to prepare the rocket for launch in full. True, a more specific task was set only upon arrival at the training ground.

And at the end of July, intensive daily preparation of the launch batteries on the training rocket began. One set of rocket battery equipment was assembled, spare parts and additional reserve equipment were selected. All units have undergone in-depth maintenance. A large amount of work was carried out on acquisition, packaging and preparation for loading of various types of property and material resources to ensure the life of the division at the training ground. You had to take everything with you: lumber, plywood, hardware, barbed wire, firewood and, of course, “bargaining chip” - alcohol. Frames for camp tents, sun loungers, collapsible toilets, guard mushrooms, etc. were prepared. The completeness of clothing and personal hygiene items was checked. The personnel received the necessary preventive medical vaccinations.

At the appointed time, a train of 20 (?) units of rolling stock: a staff car - a passenger car, covered cars - heated cars for personnel, gondola cars - for property and field kitchens, platforms - for equipment, set off from the Gardene station.

The echelon followed the route: Gardene - Saratov - further, crossing to the left bank of the Volga - Krasny Kut - Elton - Verkhniy Baskunchak - Kapustin Yar - site 70. After 7 days, the train arrived at the 87km railway station. Privolzhskaya Railway, which was adjacent to the railway network 4 GCP. They reorganized.

And after some time, the locomotive was already moving along the only railway track to the unloading site. The first thing that struck me was the absolutely flat steppe that stretched on both sides of the path.

About two hours later the train arrived at the unloading site. After unloading, handing over the wagons and equipment to the railway representative, a march was made to the temporary parking lot of site 70, indicated by the lodgers. Officers and conscripts were housed in a shield dormitory; meals were served in the military canteen, where they had to stand in long lines. The personnel were located in the camp field town in army tents, the equipment was in the field vehicle fleet. Food from camp kitchens. Water was transported by a water washer from the Akhtuba River. (Already during subsequent visits of combat crews to the range, starting in 1966, the personnel were housed in the barracks, ate in the range soldiers’ canteen. Missile technology was received at the range)

Preparations for the test began, but first a certain amount of housework had to be completed. That was the order. Not a single crew arriving at the test site could do without such training. This “tradition” was preserved for all subsequent years. At the same time, we were preparing to pass tests to the training ground’s instructor group. This was no less a difficult task, and sometimes it was necessary to “pay off” with alcohol. (Upon arrival at the test site, there was a command to hand over the alcohol that had been brought. Some had to be handed over, but most were saved by hiding the canisters under the floor in a secret part, which was located together with the headquarters in the switchboard structure of the test site).

After passing the tests, the launch site was determined, where all the battery equipment was transported. A combat missile and SRT were received. After the checks, everything was concentrated on the launch pad.

I must say a few words about the work of the division headquarters. A large number of documents were processed and executed, the existence of which was unknown:

— lists of all personnel who arrived at the training ground were compiled. Lists have been compiled for issuing temporary passes to the 10th site (center of the training ground) and to other sites (warehouses);

— draft orders for the receipt and transportation of combat missiles and SRT have been developed,

— lists of personnel remaining at the launch site in various degrees of readiness and in the launch bunker at the time of rocket launch were compiled;

— a plan and scheme for the evacuation of equipment and personnel with a time-based evacuation schedule has been drawn up.

In addition to all this, the headquarters along the route was engaged in numerous redirections of the train, organizing guard and commandant services on the way and at stops, organizing interaction with the military commandant’s office at railway stations to replenish the necessary supplies of food and water, and organizing the training process. Already at the training ground, the headquarters resolved issues of organizing guard and commandant services at the launch site, ensured the work of the security forces and resolved issues related to life support.

So, all theoretical tests have been passed, working documentation has been worked out, and the equipment is ready. Combat work began. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th starting batteries coped with their task, receiving excellent ratings. The last battery, the 1st battery, began preparing for and conducting a combat training launch. Everything went according to plan. Personnel not directly involved in preparing the rocket for launch were evacuated to an evacuation point. Everyone looked intently at the point in the area where the rocket was supposed to launch. The tension of all personnel reached its climax.

Perhaps this verse is appropriate for this moment:

The rocket is, of course, not filled with water,

And it’s high time to press the start button,

Come on, friend, we'll step aside

Oh, I wish I could fly away, God forbid we leak it again.

Emergency start

Time passed slowly. And finally, a flame burst out, the rocket was enveloped in oxidizer vapors and smoke of burnt fuel. A deafening roar was heard. Many saw this for the first time.

The rocket slowly broke away from the launcher and went skyward. But..., having risen to a height of about 1000 meters, the rocket hovered and fell to the ground, hitting the “target” - a sheep shed.

A commission immediately began working to identify the causes of the emergency launch. All working documentation and individual equipment were confiscated and sealed. First of all, they started shaking the head of the police department, Art. Lieutenant B. Petrashkevich (our Peku), and then the rest. The combat crew performed all technological operations under the control of the training ground instructor group in accordance with the requirements of the instructions.

We figured it out. No personnel were found to be at fault, but the battery rating was only “good.” The rocket was found to be responsible for the emergency launch. (See V.A. Rylova for more details).

The division returned to its permanent location in October.

Based on the results of the test, the State Commission came to the conclusion that it was advisable to create a training rocket (UTR), on which it would be possible to carry out multiple refuelings at the BSP without going to the test site.

In August to the staff of each missile division of the regiment rocket engineering service is introduced, headed by the deputy division commander for missile weapons (chief engineer of the division), consisting of 3 senior engineers:

  • on launch and propulsion equipment;
  • on electrical equipment;
  • for refueling equipment - he is also a safety inspector.

At the same time, the service of the chief engineer of the regiment a repair shop is being introduced (RM-61). And on its basis, repair and technical units were formed, which were entrusted with the task of mastering the maintenance and repair of rocket technology units.

The personnel of RM-61 were located in Dobele-2, along with the supply battery. In the 1st Division, construction of a technological building began. RM-61 was led at different times by Makarov, Trichegrub, Gomonov.

On September 23-24, for the purpose of familiarization, the regiment was visited by the Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. Bagramyan. They paid special attention to resolving issues of logistics support and interaction with the rear of the Baltic Military District.

On September 30, the 3rd silo-based missile division (division commander, Major Yu. P. Potapov) took up combat duty, consisting of 3 GPPs with 4 silo-based launchers with the R-12U missile.

Although few people know that everything was not so smooth. The GShRV Commission for the reception of the division was headed by OU officer Colonel I.F. Nikolaev (future deputy commander of the 29th missile division). He initially concluded that the division was not ready for combat duty, although the main shortcomings identified by the commission were in the nature of construction and installation deficiencies.

The commanders of the 3rd Division were: Antropov(1960-1962), Yu.V.Potapov(1962-1971), A.D. Krasnov(1971-1973), Usychenko (1973-?)

You can learn more about the organizational structure of the 3rd Division by reading the memoirs of the officers of the 3rd Division. (see Kozlov).

In addition, it should be noted that silo launchers, although they were considered a reusable structure, it turned out that after each launch it was necessary to carry out a lot of repair and restoration work lasting several days. Therefore, silo complexes with R12U MRBMs in real combat operations were designed for only one salvo. But, nevertheless, the second and third launches appeared in all the documents developed in the division. The missiles of the 2nd launch were actually stored in storage at the BSP of the first division, the 3rd - at the BSP of the second.

With the arrival of the 3rd division on combat duty, the regiment began to carry out combat duty with 12 combat crews, of which 8 with the R-12 ground-based missile and 4 with the R-12U silo version.

On December 15, to provide radio communications to the 867th and 307th missile regiments, a separate combined radio control center was formed with a deployment at the 307th regiment (Jelgava).

The arriving equipment could not leave the platform under its own power. The tanks, despite the preventive repairs carried out in Sverdlovsk, showed no signs of life. Only two of this batch could roll to the ground. The rest were dragged off, swearing and sweating, by militia fighters.

The instructors who arrived from Moscow also cursed along with them. A couple of months later, unexpectedly for many, these guys found themselves at the controls of tanks. Leo Tolstoy warned in “Hadji Murat” - you can’t trust them! The tank column that rolled into Grozny found itself without cover. The horsemen, who had been showing off in brand new uniforms and with oiled machine guns for two months, fled after the first shots, leaving Russian tank crews without cover and without guides in an unfamiliar city. Only a group of Cossacks, who somehow found themselves among the landing force, tried to clear the way for heavy vehicles. The battle was bloody. The guys stayed in the bristling city for more than a day. They waited for more than a day for help. But there was no contact with them. Stepashin was informed that the city had been taken. This fit into the military strategy. (Pavel Grachev spoke about the capture of Grozny by two battalions of paratroopers not for the sake of a nice word. He was right. But for this little was needed. Those who developed the military phase of the operation should sit down and think. Think through everything to the last detail, to the smallest detail. But how wrote Jaroslav Hasek, “the war went on as usual until the General Staff intervened.”) On this day, the president delivered his annual message. The FSB director who contacted him reported on the capture of Grozny. However, upon returning from the Kremlin, Stepashin was forced to listen to a new report, which fundamentally contradicted the first: “A fierce battle is underway. There are losses among tankers. Help is needed". - Which tankers? - The director was almost speechless. - What kind are in tanks? -Where are they from? After all, we were only talking about instructors and repairmen. The head of the department shrugged his shoulders. - It happened. It was naive to believe that everything just happened that way. Giving instructions to select people to train CHECHEN tank crews, Stepashin warned that not a single Russian should be among the armed people. Moreover, the selection had to be carried out exclusively among reservists. However, the tankers were active. By nightfall the situation became even more complicated. “I’m ready to submit my resignation,” the general suggested, feeling guilty. “Who... needs your resignation,” Stepashin grabbed the Kremlin communications apparatus. Grachev almost cried. - The guys are dying! Help is needed. Stepashin knew that there was a reserve. The forces of the internal troops were concentrated in Mozdok to begin possible actions. Erin supported the idea. I asked for some time to contact Kulikov. To do this, it was necessary to enlist the support of the president. After listening to the report of the director of FSK, he agreed with the opinion. “Send in the troops!” However, more information came from Kulikov. "Everything is over! It’s too late to send troops.” And in Grozny there was a battle.